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Abstract 
We analyze the influence of IT governance on IT investment performance using a sample dataset 
from Fortune 1000 firms.  A key challenge in the study is that the appropriate IT governance mode 
varies across firms and across business units.  We address the challenge by developing an 
empirical model based on earlier studies on multiple contingency factors of IT governance.  We 
use the model to predict the appropriate IT governance mode for each business unit and use the 
difference between the predicted and observed IT governance mode to derive a measure of a 
firm’s IT governance misalignment.  We find that firms with high IT governance misalignment 
receive no benefits from IT investments, while firms with low IT governance misalignment obtain 
two to three times the value from IT investments compared to firms with average IT governance 
misalignment.  Our results highlight the importance of IT governance in realizing value from IT 
investments.   
Keywords:  IT governance, Business Value of IT, IT Investments, ROA Analysis, Tobin’s q  
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Résumé  
Nous analysons l’influence de la gouvernance des TI sur la rentabilité des investissements en TI sur un échantillon 
de 1000 grandes entreprises. Nous développons une mesure empirique du mauvais alignement de la gouvernance 
des TI basée sur plusieurs théories de contingence. Les résultats montrent que les entreprises ayant le niveau 
d’alignement le plus mauvais (respectivement, moins mauvais) ne réalisent pas (respectivement, réalisent) des 
bénéfices de leurs investissements en TI. Nos résultats soulignent l’importance de la gouvernance des TI dans la 
création de la valeur. 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, IT investment has accounted for an increasing share of capital investments in US firms. 
Real investment in information technology increased from less than 30 percent of nonresidential equipment and 
software investment in 1985 to close to 60 percent in 2004 (BEA 2007).  The return on IT investment, however, 
varies significantly across firms.  Standish Group reports that 15 percent of all IT investments are abandoned, and 
another 50 percent are delayed or delivered without meeting user expectations (Schwartz 2004).   
The high variations in IT investment performance have been attributed to a variety of organizational factors .  These 
factors1 range from organizational structure (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1997; Brynjolfsson et al. 2002; Cron and Sobol 
1983), to human capital practices (Francalanci and Galal 1998; Bresnahan, Bryjolfsson and Hitt 2000), to 
operational and managerial capabilities (Banker, et. al. 2006; Kearns and Sabherwal 2006; Tanriverdi 2005; Weill 
1992), to outsourcing strategy and inter-firm integration (Bardhan et. al. 2007; Rai et. al. 2006), to the alignment 
between IT and organizational capabilities (Zhu and Kraemer. 2002; Aral and Weill 2007; Bardhan et al. 2007),  and 
to the usage of IT assets and systems (Devaraj and Kohli 2003; Aral et. al. 2006; Dos Santos 1993; Mukhopadhyay 
et. al. 1997). It is suggested that a firm’s failure to recognize these organizational factors and implement necessary 
changes contributes to diminished returns from its IT investments.   
However, organizational factors alone cannot explain variations in IT investment performance. A well-run business 
is expected to foresee the need to implement complementary organizational changes and to make the necessary 
organizational investments along with IT investments.   We posit that an important factor that leads firms to 
potentially overlook organizational factors when making IT investments lies in the investment decision process and, 
in particular, in a firm’s IT governance mode.   
IT governance refers to the allocation of IT decision rights within a firm (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999). The 
complementarity between IT investments and organizational factors indicates that IT decisions should be made at 
the right organizational level to ensure that both IT and organizational changes are considered in the IT investment 
decisions.   IT governance is especially important for large and multiunit firms (Watson and Brancheau 1991; 
Brown and Magill 1994; Weill and Ross 2004).   Since the headquarters of large firms are often removed from the 
daily operations of business units, the information asymmetry forces headquarters to make a trade-off between 
centralizing decision rights to leverage economies of scale and synergies across multiple business units, and 
decentralizing decision rights to empower individual business units.  Research shows that there is no single IT 
governance mode that fits all firms (Brown and Magill 1994; Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999).  A more centralized 
governance mode is preferred by firms with significant cost or revenue synergies across business units, while a more 
decentralized governance mode is preferred by firms that value local agility (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; Csaszar 
and Clemons 2006; Xue et al. 2007).   
Despite substantial research on IT governance and on IT investment performance, there have been relatively few 
studies on how IT governance influences IT investment performance.  The objective of this study is to assess the 
influence of IT governance on IT investment performance by using sample data from Fortune 1000 companies.  A 
key challenge in the analysis is the varying nature of IT governance across firms and across business units within a 
firm.  We address this challenge by first developing a measure of IT governance misalignment that assesses the 
degree to which a firm or a business unit’s adopted IT governance mode deviates from the ideal governance mode 
predicted using a multiple contingency factor model of IT governance.   We then analyze how the IT governance 
                                                          
1
 Organizational factors are not the only contributors to variations in IT investment returns.  The variations could also be caused by inherent 
differences in firm or industry characteristics.  For example, Dewan, et. al. (2007) find that differences in firms’ IT risk are strongly associated 
with variations in IT investment returns. 
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misalignment influences IT investment performance.  We find that IT governance misalignment has a significant 
moderating effect on the performance contribution of a firm’s IT investments.  Firms with high IT governance 
misalignment derive no value from their IT investments; while businesses with low IT governance misalignment 
obtain two to three times the value from their IT investments compared to firms with average IT governance 
misalignment.   
The analysis also validates the use of the multiple contingency factor model in assessing firms’ IT governance 
decisions. Prior research has highlighted the importance of considering multiple contingency factors in IT 
governance (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999). However, these studies are mainly based on case studies or small-
sample analysis, and their generalizability has not been assessed. By conducting a large-sample study and by 
demonstrating that firms that deviate from the model’s prediction have significantly lower IT investment 
performance, we validate the generalizability of the multiple contingency factor model to a broad spectrum of firms.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the theoretical foundation of the 
study.  After that, we present the multiple contingency factor model of IT governance and develop a measure of IT 
governance misalignment.  We then assess the influence of IT governance misalignment on firms’ IT investment 
performance.  Finally, we conclude with implications and limitations.   
Theoretical Foundation and Hypotheses 
Information technology is a “general purpose technology” (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
1995).  The value of such technology depends on how firms utilize it to enhance their management and operations.  
IT assets sitting on the shelf of warehouses generate no value for a firm, while IT assets embedded in a firm’s daily 
operations are often indispensible.  As a general purpose technology, IT’s usage goes beyond simple automation.  
Studies indicate that a significant portion of the business value generated by information technology comes from 
complementarities between information technology and organizational practices (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Basu 
and Jarnagin 2008). 
A variety of organizational practices have been considered in the literature.  Bresnahan et al. (2000) find that 
information technology facilitates a firm’s delegation of more authority to individuals and business units at lower 
organizational levels.  Firms adopting a decentralized organizational structure obtain higher productivity and more 
value from their IT investments.  Brynjolfsson et al. (2000) show that the same result holds when firm value is 
measured based on stock market valuation.  Devaraj and Kohli (2003) find that the value of IT investments depends 
on actual usage. This study highlights the importance of having organizational practices in place to motivate 
productive usage of IT assets.  Tanriverdi (2006) finds that exploring IT synergies across business units plays an 
important role in bringing out the value of IT investments. This finding suggests that businesses need to make 
necessary organizational changes to leverage cross-unit IT synergies. Melville et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive 
overview of the literature and find that the value of IT investments is dependent on a number of internal and external 
factors, ranging from complementary organizational resources to macro market environments.   
The presence of organizational and environmental factors highlights the fact that IT investment decisions are not just 
local decisions. IT investment decisions need to be made at the appropriate organizational level to ensure that 
multiple organizational and environmental factors are taken into consideration. A growing literature on IT 
governance addresses this question and studies the optimal allocation of IT decision rights (e.g., Sambamurthy and 
Zmud 1999; Xue et al. 2007). These studies reveal that there is no single IT governance mode that fits all businesses. 
The optimal IT governance mode is determined by a rich set of multiple contingency factors.   
Despite the large body of research in IT governance, a key question remains unanswered: how effective is IT 
governance in deriving business value from IT investments?  The few studies on this issue have obtained mixed 
results. Weill and Ross (2004) conduct a survey of IT governance in 250 large enterprises and find that “firms with 
superior IT governance have at least 20% higher profit than firms with poor IT governance.” The study indicates 
that IT governance is strongly correlated with overall firm performance.  Tanriverdi (2006) studies firms’ ability to 
leverage IT synergies across business units and the moderating effect of IT governance on this ability. The study 
hypothesizes that “performance effects of IT synergies will be highest in firms using a centralized IT governance 
mode…” He finds no evidence to support the hypothesis. 
These studies show that researchers have different views on how IT governance influences firm performance.  Weill 
and Ross (2004) focus on the direct effect of IT governance on firm performance, while Tanriverdi (2006) examines 
how IT governance moderates the influence of IT relatedness on firm performance.  In this study, we note that the 
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ultimate goal of IT governance is to bring out the business value of IT investment.  When IT investment is small, IT 
governance will have little impact on firm performance.  The influence of IT governance rises with the scale of a 
firm’s IT investment.  We, therefore, propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: IT governance moderates the relationship between IT investment and firm performance.   
Measuring IT Governance Alignments 
A key challenge in testing the implications of IT governance is to first determine whether a firm has adopted an 
appropriate IT governance mode.  Prior studies find that the IT governance choice is influenced by multiple 
contingency factors and that the ideal IT governance mode varies across firms and across business units within a 
firm.  Therefore, we first develop an empirical IT governance model to identify a business unit’s ideal IT 
governance mode.     
The objective of the IT governance model is to provide a valid and quantitative measure for IT governance 
alignment and to later assess its influence on firms’ IT investment performance.  To ensure the validity of the 
measure, it is imperative for the IT governance model to be built on a well-established body of knowledge on IT 
governance.  In this regard, Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) provide an excellent synthesis of the multiple 
contingency factors of IT governance.  We leverage these contingency factors to develop the IT governance model.   
Governance issues arise whenever the interests of headquarters and business units are not in full alignment 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Hart 1995).  Agency theory identifies two key countervailing forces 
that influence the optimal allocation of decision rights: incentive misalignment and information asymmetry.  
Incentive misalignment encourages centralization of decision rights so that headquarters can maximize profits for 
the entire firm.  Information asymmetry encourages decentralization of decision rights to business units, as they are 
closer to the market and have better and timelier information for decision making.   
Incentive Misalignment 
The main cause for incentive misalignment in a multiunit firm is the presence of cost or revenue synergies across 
business units.   When decisions are made at the business unit level, little regard is given to the synergies that could 
benefit other units.  Centralizing decision making allows a firm to take full consideration of potential synergies and 
maximize the overall performance.  Synergies are especially important for IT investments such as IT infrastructure, 
management practices, and IT applications that can be shared across business units (Tanriverdi 2006).  Prior studies 
of IT governance find three categories of contingency factors that affect synergies across business units.   
First, IT investment exhibits economies of scale.  The fixed cost of IT infrastructure is significant, while the variable 
cost is often minimal.  Sharing IT infrastructure across business units can dramatically cut down duplications and 
save costs on IT investments.  The benefits of economies of scale are especially valuable to smaller business units 
that are below the minimum efficient scale.  Larger business units, on the other hand, benefit less from sharing IT 
infrastructure, as they are often large enough to obtain economies of scale within their own operations.  Moreover, 
when an IT infrastructure grows in scale, coordination costs increase significantly, limiting the potential of cost 
synergy.  Therefore, size is a key contingency factor in a business unit’s IT governance choice (Ein-Dor and Segev 
1982, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999). 
Second, IT investment exhibits economies of scope.  Economies of scope refer to the cost or revenue synergies 
within a multiunit firm that operates across related industries.  Knowledge and investments in one industry may 
benefit business operations in other related industries and, thus, reduce costs and increase revenues.  Economies of 
scope in multiunit firms are related to a firm’s diversification strategy, including diversification breadth and 
diversification mode (Brown and Magill 1994, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999).  Diversification breadth refers to the 
market relatedness of a multiunit firm.  Synergies are stronger between related industries and markets, since they 
share common bases of customers, production, and knowledge. On the other hand, firms that diversify further away 
from their core business are less likely to share common resources and thus obtain fewer synergies from centralized 
IT governance.  A business unit that is closely related to a firm’s core industry can therefore benefit more from 
synergies with other related business units, and is more likely to have centralized IT governance as the headquarters 
make IT investment decisions for all related business units. A business unit that is unrelated to a firm’s core industry 
has few synergies with other business units, and therefore is more likely to have decentralized IT governance and 
make its own IT investment decisions.   Synergies among business units are influenced not only by diversification 
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breadth but also from a firm’s diversification mode.  Firms relying on internal growth are more familiar with the 
entry industry and are better able to exploit synergies among business units than firms growing through acquisitions.   
Third, the general corporate governance affects a firm’s capability to leverage IT synergies across business units.  A 
centralized corporate governance mode makes it easier for a business to exploit cross-unit synergies than a 
decentralized corporate governance mode (Applegate et al. 1996; Brown and Magill 1994).  As a result, a firm with 
centralized corporate governance is more likely to adopt centralized IT governance as well.   
In summary, the motivation to leverage synergies across business units drives firms to adopt a centralized IT 
governance mode.  However, cross-unit synergies are not the only driving force that influences IT governance.  An 
equally important driving force is information asymmetry. 
Information Asymmetry 
In large firms, headquarters are often removed from business unit operations.  The cost and time delay in receiving 
information about business unit operations provides a disincentive for headquarters to centralize decision rights.  
The magnitude of information asymmetry varies with the size of the business unit.  Large scale operations not only 
produce more information, but also produce more fragmented information.  Business unit size, therefore, influences 
the allocation of IT decision rights through both incentive misalignment and information asymmetry.  Similarly, 
diversification breadth also influences the information asymmetry between headquarters and business units.  Firms 
diversified into related industries are more familiar with the industry environment of each business unit and suffer 
less information asymmetry compared to those diversified into unrelated industries.  Diversification breadth, 
therefore, also influences both incentive misalignment and information asymmetry in IT governance decisions.   
Information asymmetry is also influenced by the depth of local IT knowledge at the business unit level.  Substantial 
local IT knowledge empowers a business unit to leverage its local information that increases the information 
advantages enjoyed by the business unit (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999).   
The above factors outline an empirical model that identifies the ideal IT governance mode for a business unit, given 
various contingency factors.  We develop an empirical model based on the above factors using sample data from 
Fortune 1000 firms.  By comparing the predicted IT governance mode with the IT governance mode adopted by a 
business unit, we obtain a measure of the IT governance misalignment at the business unit level. We aggregate the 
IT governance misalignment of all business units of a firm to identify the overall IT governance misalignment of the 
firm and then study its relationship with IT investment performance.   
Data 
We combine data from four main sources in this study. First, we obtained data on IT resources and IT governance 
from the CI Technology Database. This database contains detailed information about IT infrastructure in over 
500,000 business establishments in the United States and Canada.  Harte-Hanks maintains this database through 
over 7,000 phone-based interviews every month.  The information in the database covers 10 key IT areas, including 
personal computing, systems and servers, networking, software, storage, and managed services. Various versions of 
this database has been used in prior research in the IS literature (e.g., Zhu and Kraemer 2002; Forman 2005; Chen 
and Forman 2006; Xue et al. 2008).    
Harte-Hanks identifies three levels of business establishments: branches, divisional headquarters, and firm 
headquarters.  Divisional headquarters represent business units, while firm headquarters identify firms.  For this 
research, we use business unit level data for measuring IT governance misalignment and firm level data for 
assessing the impact of IT governance misalignment on IT investment performance.  The analysis of IT investment 
performance also requires financial data at the firm level, which restricts the scope of the research to public 
companies.  Given the data needs, we acquired from Harte-Hanks data on all Fortune 1000 companies and their 
business units between 2001 and 2005.  The data contains information on IT resources at both the business unit and 
the firm level.  A unique aspect of the CI database is that it records three types of IT decisions at each business unit: 
PC purchasing decisions, server purchasing decisions, and network purchasing decisions.  For each decision, the 
database indicates whether the decision is made by the headquarters (represented as “Parent”) or by the business unit 
(represented as “Local”).  The collection of the three purchasing decision variables captures not only a firm’s use of 
a pure or federal IT governance mode at each business unit, but also the degree of centralization/decentralization in 
the governance mode.   
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One important limitation of using these variables for the IT governance alignment measure is that the data only 
contains variables on IT infrastructure governance.   Prior IT governance studies suggest that the IT governance 
mode varies for different aspects of IT management (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; Tanriverdi 2006).  Therefore, 
the IT infrastructure governance mode does not represent a firm’s overall IT governance mode.  To address this 
limitation, we adopt the approach of measuring IT governance misalignment instead of measuring IT governance 
itself.  The approach is based on the premise that, while firms may use different governance modes for different 
aspects of IT management, the ability of a firm to choose the right governance mode is usually consistent.  A firm 
that demonstrates good ability in making the right choice for IT infrastructure governance is also likely to make the 
right choices for other aspects of IT governance.  Therefore, the alignment measure of a firm’s IT infrastructure 
governance is a proxy for the firm’s overall IT governance alignment.  In addition, we note that good IT 
infrastructure governance is the foundation for overall good IT governance.  As Weill and Ross (2004) note, IT 
infrastructure constitutes over 50% of a firm’s IT investment. Also, due to the compatiability constraints of 
information technology, IT infrastructure has a significant influence on application adoption and use management. 
Many applications do not work across different infrastructure platforms and project development and use 
management could be hampered by developers and users who are used to different infrastructure environments.  
Misalignment of IT infrastructure governance, therefore, has a very significant bearing on the misalignment of 
overall IT governance.   
Second, to identity the diversification mode of a multiunit firm, we use the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A) database.  The SDC Platinum M&A database records all publicly announced M&A transactions.  Each 
record contains information about the two sides of the transaction, their primary SIC codes, balance sheet 
information, and details on the M&A deal including the value, effective date, and the percentage acquired from the 
target firm.  We measure the diversification mode of a multiunit firm based on its five-year history of M&A 
transactions.   We use the ratio of average M&A value over revenue to indicate the degree to which a firm’s 
diversification mode is driven by M&A transactions.   A higher ratio suggests the firm is mainly growing through 
acquisitions, while a lower ratio suggests that the firm is largely growing through internal development.  
Third, to identify the corporate governance mode adopted by a multiunit firm, we use the Corporate Affiliations 
database from Lexis-Nexis.  The database documents detailed subsidiary relationships within a firm.  In particular, it 
records whether a subsidiary reports directly to the headquarters or to any other subsidiary.  The subsidiary 
relationships reflect the degree of centralization regarding the general corporate governance mode adopted by a firm.  
A firm with most of its subsidiaries reporting directly to the headquarters indicates a powerful headquarters with 
more centralized governance. On the other hand, if a firm’s subsidiaries have more authority in governing other 
subsidiaries, the firm has a corporate structure with more decentralized governance.   
Finally, to analyze the impact of IT governance on IT investment performance, we obtain financial and performance 
data from the Compustat Industrial Annual database.  These data include Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s q, Sales, 
Employee, R&D investments, Market Share, Capital Investments and Debt-to-equity ratio.   
Operationalization and Empirical Approach 
Variables for Measuring IT Governance Alignment 
Dependent Variable 
We use IT Purchasing Decision to measure the IT governance mode at the business unit level.  As mentioned earlier, 
the CI database records three types of IT purchasing decisions: PC purchasing decisions, server purchasing 
decisions, and network purchasing decisions. For each decision, the CI database indicates whether it is made by the 
headquarters or by the business unit. We aggregate the three decision variables to represent a business unit’s IT 
governance mode.  Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) point out that most firms have switched from a pure centralized 
or pure decentralized IT governance mode to a federal IT governance mode where headquarters and business units 
assume authority for different types of IT decisions.  Therefore, it is important to look within the federal governance 
mode.  We encode the IT purchasing decision into a binary variable (denoted as ITDec) that indicates whether a 
business unit adopts a more centralized or a more decentralized mode of IT governance.  If at least two types of the 
IT purchasing decisions are made by a business unit, we set ITDec=1, which means that the business unit adopts a 
more decentralized IT governance mode. If at least two types of IT purchasing decisions are made by the 
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headquarters, we set ITDec=0, which means that the business unit adopts a more centralized IT governance mode2. 
Independent Variables 
Business Unit Size: The size of the business unit (denoted as Size) is measured by the natural logarithm value of 
total employees in the business unit, as reported in the Harte-Hanks database.   
Diversification Breadth: To assess diversification breadth, we compare the industry a business unit resides in to the 
industry of its headquarters.  Variable DivBreadth identifies the distance between the two using a measure similar to 
Palepu (1985) on product market difference.   If a business unit and its headquarters are in the same 4-digit NAICS 
industry, then DivBreadth=0. If a business unit and its headquarters are in the same 2-digit NAICS industry group 
but not the same 4-digit NAICS industry, then DivBreadth=1. If a business unit and its headquarters are in different 
2-digit NAICS industry group, then DivBreadth=2. High DivBreadth means that the business unit focuses on 
product markets different from the headquarters.  
Diversification Mode: The measure of diversification mode (denoted as DivMode) is derived using data from the 
SDC Platinum and Compustat databases. We use the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database to calculate 
the average value of mergers and acquisitions for each firm over the past five years. The ratio of average M&A 
value to the firm’s operating income (obtained from Compustat) is taken as a measure of the firm’s development 
through M&A. If this measure is small, it means that the firm mainly grows through internal expansion. If this 
measure is large, it means that the firm enters new markets mainly through mergers and acquisitions (Busija et al., 
1997).   
Corporate Governance Mode: To assess the degree of centralization associated with a multiunit firm, we derive a 
measure of the Corporate Governance Mode (denoted as CorGov) using the subsidiary relationships reported in the 
CorporateAffiliations database from Lexis-Nexis. For each firm, we first calculate the total number of subsidiaries 
that reports directly to the headquarters. We then divide this number by the total number of subsidiaries of a firm 
reported in the database and take the consequent ratio as a measure of centralization of the multiunit firm. If this 
measure is larger, it means that a firm’s headquarters has more control over its subdivisions (Collis et al. 2007). In 
this case, the corporate governance is more centralized. If this measure is lower, it means that the subsidiaries of the 
firm have more authority and the corporate structure is more decentralized.   
Local IT Knowledge: The business unit’s IT knowledge (denoted as ITKnow) is measured by the ratio of IT 
employees to the total employees of the unit.  A low ratio indicates that the business unit has less IT-related 
knowledge. A high ratio of IT employees indicates that the business unit not only contributes more knowledge in 
investing and managing IT assets, but also provides more IT-related support for business processes. 
Industry IT Effect: Industry effect has been shown to significantly influence firms’ strategies (Mauri and Michaels 
1998).  It is, therefore, necessary to control for heterogeneity in the industry environment that is not observable to 
researchers.  We use 2-digit NAICS dummy variables to control for the industry effect.  
Empirical Model for IT Governance  
We employ a logistic regression model to identify the ideal IT governance mode for each business unit.  
 
  (1) 
 
                                                          
2
 The traditional approach would encode IT purchasing decision as a three-level variable for pure centralized, federal or pure decentralized 
governance mode.  This encoding scheme focuses on variations across the three types of governance modes.  However, our data shows that more 
than 90 percent of all business units adopt some form of federal IT governance.  The traditional encoding scheme, therefore, would capture little 
variations in IT governance modes.  This potentially explains the insignificant results found in earlier studies that use such a three-level variable 
measure of IT governance to assess the influence of IT governance on firm performance (e.g. Tanriverdi 2006).    The two-level approach 
adopted in this study looks inside the federal governance mode and identifies whether they are more centralized or more decentralized.  This new 
approach allows us to capture a significant amount of variation in IT governance modes and obtain a better fit for the regression model.   
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In the above logistic regression model, a positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the corresponding independent 
variable increases (decreases) the chance of adopting a more decentralized IT governance mode.  Given the findings 
of prior studies, we expect that four of the contingency factors - business unit size (α1), diversification breadth (α2), 
diversification mode (α3), local IT knowledge (α5) - to be positively associated with decentralized IT governance, 
and the remaining factor - corporate governance mode (α4), - to be negatively associated with decentralized IT 
governance.   The regression model also includes industry fixed effect and time fixed effect as control variables. 
We apply the regression model to the IT governance decisions at the business unit level and use the results to predict 
the ideal IT governance mode for a given combination of contingency factors for a business unit.  The predicted IT 
governance mode could be different from the actual IT governance mode adopted by the business unit.  We measure 
the deviation using the absolute value of standardized Pearson residual.  The Pearson residual identifies the 
difference between the predicted and the observed IT governance mode and makes adjustments for variations in 
standard deviations of the difference3.    The absolute residual provides a measure of IT governance misalignment 
for each business unit. 
Since the objective of this study is to link IT governance misalignment with firms’ IT investment performance, we 
aggregate IT governance misalignment measures to the firm level.  We use the revenue-weighted average of IT 
governance misalignment for the aggregation.    
Variables for Measuring Influence of IT Governance  
Dependent Variable 
We consider two measures of firm performance: Return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q.  Return on assets identifies 
a firm’s ability to generate profits from its assets.  This measure has been widely used in prior studies (e.g., Hitt and 
Bryjolfsson 1996; Tanriverdi 2006; Kohli and Devaraj 2003).  One drawback of the ROA measure is its narrow 
focus on firm profitability in the current fiscal year (Tanriverdi 2006).  The value of IT governance, however, could 
take years to materialize.  To capture the long-term influence of IT governance, we also use Tobin’s q as a measure 
of firm performance.  Tobin’s q is a forward-looking measure that reflects market expectations of future firm 
performance (Bharadwaj 2000; Berk et al. 1998).   
Independent Variable 
IT Governance Misalignment: The key independent variable in our analysis of firm performance is the IT 
governance misalignment measure derived from the IT governance model in the previous section.    
IT Capital: We measure IT capital using data from the CI database.  The database provides detailed information 
about the IT infrastructure for each firm.  We estimate a firm’s IT capital using industry estimates of average IT 
assets prices and labor costs.  The price of PCs is obtained from Zdnet (2005) and the price of servers is assumed to 
be five times that of PCs (Edwards and Tiley 2004).  We measure PC and server capital by multiplying number of 
PCs and servers with the respective prices, deflated by the BEA’s price index for the category “Computers and 
Peripheral Equipment” of the Fixed Private Nonresidential Investment (Lee and Barua 1999).  IT labor cost is 
measured by multiplying the number of a firm’s IT employees with industry-average labor compensation, deflated 
by the Index of Total Compensation Cost.  Following Hitt and Bryjolfsson (1995), the total IT capital is calculated 
as the sum of PCs and servers capital plus three times the IT labor cost. To overcome potentially missing software-
related expenditure in this measure (Hitt and Bryjolfsson 1996), we also consider an alternative measure based on 
the total-ownership-cost (TOC) of networked LAN PCs. Industry research report that the total-ownership-cost 
(TOC) of IT each year can be estimated at $11,900 per networked LAN node (Cappuccio et. al. 1996). This measure 
of TOC includes hardware, software, and other related expenditures. We use the deflated value of this TOC measure 
for an alternative estimate of the total IT capital.  We then take the average of these two IT capital measures as our 
measure of IT capital. To standardize the measure of IT capital across firms, we divide IT capital by total assets of a 
firm.   
Control Variables 
                                                          
3
 The variations in standard deviation arise due to the discrete nature of IT governance mode.  If a business unit is predicted to be x% centralized, 
it has x% probability to adopt a centralized governance mode and 1-x% probability to adopt a decentralized governance mode.  The standard 
deviation is therefore x%)-x%(1 , which varies with x. 
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Industry Performance: Existing literature suggests that industry characteristics influence firm performance 
(McGahan and Porter 1999; Bharadwaj et al. 1999). Thus, we use the average ROA, and the average Tobin’s q of 
the firm’s primary industry (at the 4-digit NAICS code level), respectively, to control for industry effect. 
Past performance: A firm’s past performance captures managerial capabilities unobserved to researchers but has 
been shown to have significant influence on firm performance (Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Tanriverdi 2006).  
We use the average ROA value of a firm over the previous five years as a control for past ROA-based performance, 
and the average Tobin’s q of a firm over the previous five years as a control for past Tobin’s q-based performance. 
Firm size: Size not only influences a firm’s choice of IT governance mode, but also affects its financial 
performance.  Economies of scale provide significant advantages to large firms in the form of lower costs.  Firm size 
also affects internal coordination costs in a multiunit firm, as coordination costs increase exponentially with firm 
size.   We measure firm size using two variables: logarithm of total number of employees and logarithm of total 
sales.   
Other control variables: We also follow the existing literature (Hitt and Bryjolfsson 1996; Bharadwaj et al. 1999, 
Capon et. al. 1990) to incorporate an extensive set of control variables that may affect a firm’s performance.  These 
variables include R&D expenditure, diversification, market share, capital investment, and debt-to-equity ratio.4  
Table 2 presents a list of variables for the firm performance model, the data sources, and the descriptive statistics.   
Empirical Model for IT Governance on Firm Performance  
We expect IT governance misalignment to have a negative moderating effect on the influence of IT capital on firm 
performance.  The higher the misalignment between the IT governance mode and the internal and external 
environment of a firm, the less the business value that the firm can generate from its IT assets. We use the following 
regression model to investigate how IT governance impacts IT business value. 
 
 (2) 
 
 (3) 
Results    
Choice of IT Governance  
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the IT governance model.  The coefficients of all the five factors in the 
model (i.e., Size, DivBreadth, DivMode, CorpGov, ITKnow) are significant. The signs of all the coefficients are also 
consistent with the hypotheses. Specially, the coefficient on Size is positive and significant, indicating that a larger 
business unit is more likely to adopt a decentralized IT governance mode. We also observe a positive and significant 
influence of DivBreadth, confirming that a decentralized IT governance mode is more likely to be adopted by a 
business unit if it resides outside of the primary industry of the headquarters. Similarly, the coefficient of DivMode 
is positive and significant (p<0.01). This result suggests that a firm that grows through mergers and acquisitions is 
more likely to adopt decentralized IT governance. We also note that the coefficient of CorpGov is negative and 
significant (p<0.01), suggesting that a firm with more centralized corporate governance structure (i.e., more business 
units report directly to the headquarters) is less likely to adopt decentralized IT governance.  The coefficient of 
                                                          
4
 R&D is measured as the 5-year average value of R&D expenditure divided by sales. Diversification is measured using the entropy measure in 
Palepu (1985).   
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ITKnow is positive and significant as well, indicating that a business unit with more local IT knowledge is more 
likely to adopt a decentralized IT governance mode.   
Overall, our results provide strong support for the multiple contingency factor approach on IT governance.  We find 
that all five organizational contingency factors play a significant role in a firm’s IT governance choice.  The study 
reveals that it is the collective influence of the contingency factors that determines the optimal IT governance mode.  
Ignoring any of the factors may result in a mis-specified IT governance mode.   
IT Governance and Firm Performance 
The results from Table 3 specify a model for predicting the ideal IT governance mode, given a set of contingency 
factors faced by a business unit.  We use the prediction to measure IT governance misalignment for each business 
unit by comparing it against the observed IT governance mode adopted by the business unit.  We use the absolute 
value of standardized Pearson residuals for the measure.  The use of absolute value ensures that the misalignment 
measure is always positive as deviation from the predicted IT governance mode on either direction reflects 
misalignment.  A low value of the measure means that a business unit adopts an IT governance mode that is closer 
to what is prescribed by the regression model. The value of the measure increases when a business unit deviates 
from the prediction.  We aggregate the IT governance misalignment measure to the firm level by using a revenue-
weighted average across all the business units of a firm.   
Table 4 presents the results of the IT investment performance model.  We start with the base model without 
accounting for the influence of IT governance (Columns 1 and 3).  The results show that IT capital has a significant 
impact on a firm’s ROA and Tobin’s q.  These results indicate that, on average, IT capital has both a substantial 
short-term and a substantial long-term influence on firm performance.  These results are consistent with recent 
studies on the business value of IT investment (e.g. Mithas et al. 2008).  The analysis also shows that industry 
environment, past performance, and other financial decisions such as sales, R&D expenditure, diversification, 
market share, capital investment and debt-to-equity ratio also significantly influence firm performance.    
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 4 present the results of the full model, which includes the measure for IT governance 
misalignment and its interaction with IT capital. The results reveal how IT governance influences firm performance 
and, in particular, IT investment performance.  We find that IT governance does not have a direct influence on firm 
performance.  Instead, it influences firm performance by moderating the performance effect of IT capital (H1).  The 
negative coefficient on the interaction between IT capital and IT governance misalignment suggests that firms with 
poor IT governance (i.e., high IT governance misalignment) obtain much less contribution from their IT capital than 
average firms.  To identify the magnitude of the influence of IT governance on IT investment performance, Table 5 
calculates IT investment performance for firms with average IT governance misalignment, firms with IT governance 
misalignment one standard deviation below the average (these are the firms with better than average IT governance), 
and firms with IT governance misalignment one standard deviation above the average (these are the firms with 
worse than average IT governance), respectively.5  The coefficients in the table represent the impact of IT capital on 
the two firm performance measures (ROA and Tobin’s q).   The coefficients are linear functions of the coefficient 
on IT capital and the coefficient on the interaction between IT capital and IT governance misalignment6.  Their 
standard deviations are derived from the covariance matrix of the regression estimation.   The calculations show that 
when the firm’s IT governance misalignment is one standard deviation above the average, IT investments have a 
negligible or even a negative impact on firm performance.  More importantly, when the IT governance misalignment 
is one standard deviation below the average, the influence of IT investments is about two to three times the influence 
of IT investments for firms with average IT governance misalignment.  These results provide evidence that IT 
governance plays a significant role in influencing the returns from IT capital investments.  Firms with good IT 
governance obtain significantly more value from their IT capital, while firms with poor IT governance obtain no 
value.  The results also reveal that a number of other factors, particularly capital investments, market share and 
                                                          
5
 The mean and standard deviation of IT governance misalignment are 0.854 and 0.532 respectively.   
6
 The results in Table 4 indicate that the impact of IT capital on ROA with a given level of IT governance misalignment g is: 
( ) ( ) g478.0166.0Capital ITROA ×−=dd .  Since all the variables in the regression are centered, the impact of IT capital on firms with 
average IT governance misalignment is just 0.166.  The impact of IT capital on firms with IT governance misalignment one standard deviation 
below the average is 0.420 (=0.166+0.478×0.531), while the impact of IT capital on firms with IT governance misalignment one standard 
deviation above the average is -0.088 (=0.166–0.478×0.531).  The calculation for the impact of IT capital on Tobin’s q is derived with the same 
approach. 
 Gu et al. / IT Governance and IT Investment Performance 
 Twenty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, Paris 2008 11 
R&D, influence firm performance.  Without controlling for these factors, the relationship between IT governance 
and IT investment performance could be mis-measured. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Choosing the right IT governance mode is an important and challenging task.  The objective of this paper is to 
provide a quantitative framework to measure the business value of IT governance. The result shows that making the 
right choice on IT governance plays an important role in realizing the business value of IT investments. Our study 
also validates the importance of considering multiple contingency factors in making IT governance decisions. The 
results provide evidence to support the contingency factors identified in prior studies.   
The analysis furthers our understanding about the business value of IT. Studies conducted in the past decade have 
revealed that information systems are enablers. They complement other business process innovations in creating 
value, but do not generate much value on their own.  Subsequent studies, therefore, focus on identifying 
complementary business processes and organizational changes.  However, the identification of complementary 
business processes and organizational changes does not fully address what causes variations in IT investment 
performance. Businesses are expected to foresee and implement complementary business processes along with their 
IT investments. Therefore, understanding variations in IT investment performance requires us to look deeper into the 
IT investment decision process. We propose that an important cause of variations lies in IT governance, i.e., the 
allocation of IT decision rights in a firm.   
Our quantitative approach generates important managerial implications.  The regression model quantifies the trade-
off between multiple contingency factors and helps firms identify suitable governance modes for their business units 
in different environments. More importantly, the performance analysis provides clear evidence of the value and 
importance of making the right IT governance decisions.  It reveals that firms with good IT governance can realize 
two to three times the value from their IT investments compared to an average firm.  More importantly, firms with 
poor IT governance obtain little return from their IT investments. These results allow firms to quantify the value of 
IT governance and make the necessary changes to adopt appropriate IT governance modes for their business units.   
Our analysis also has a number of limitations.  First, our observation on IT governance is limited to IT infrastructure 
governance.  The analysis is build upon the premise that IT infrastructure governance plays a critical role in overall 
IT governance and that firms that are good at making the right decision for IT infrastructure governance are likely to 
be good at making the right choices for other aspects of IT governance as well.  Future research is needed to confirm 
this premise.  Second, while we show that firms differ in IT governance alignment, our analysis does not address the 
causes of such variations.  It could be related to senior management’s IT knowledge, a firm’s corporate governance 
or other organizational factors.  It will be a worthwhile endeavor to identify what causes firms to deviate from the 
ideal governance mode.  Third, our analysis focuses on the vertical distribution of IT decision rights between 
headquarters and business units.  Recent studies suggest that horizontal distribution of IT decision rights between 
business functions and IT functions also plays an important role in IT investment decisions (Aral and Weill 2007).  
It would be valuable for future research to study the horizontal distribution of IT decision rights and to examine its 
influence on the performance impact of IT investment.  Finally, IT governance is just one of the elements in a firm’s 
IT architecture (Sambamurthy and Zmud 2000; Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002).  Our analysis provides a glimpse 
into the value and importance of this element while leaving out the important task of assessing other elements and 
their interdependence to future research.  We hope that this study will motivate future empirical research on 
organizational IT architecture and their impact on the business value of IT.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
1a. IT Governance Model 
Factors Variable  Operationalization Mean S.D. 
Data 
Source 
IT Purchasing 
Decision at the 
Business Unit Level ITDec 
0 – with 2 or more IT decision centralized 
1 – with 2 or more IT decisions decentralized 
0.662 0.473 
Business Unit Size 
Size 
Natural logarithm of employee number in a business 
unit 5.384 1.369 
Diversification 
Breath (Business 
unit) 
DivBreath 
 
0 – the business unit  and headquarter have the same 
4-digit NAICS code; 1 – same 2-digit NAICS code; 
2 – different 2-digit NAICS codes 1.008 0.800 
 
 
 
CI 
Database 
Diversification 
Mode (Firm) DivMode 
Ratio of average M&A value to revenue over 5 years 
0.472 0.849 
SDC 
Database 
Corporate Structure 
(Firm) CorpGov 
Ratio of divisions reporting directly to the 
headquarter to total divisions 0.604 0.284 
Lexis-
Nexis 
IT knowledge 
(Business unit) ITKnow 
Ratio of IT employees to total employees 
0.074 0.125 
CI 
Database 
1b. IT Investment Performance Model 
Factors Variable  Operationalization Mean S.D. 
Data 
Source 
 
IT Capital 
IT 
 
 
The average of two measures. The first is total PC 
and server expenditures plus 3 times IT labor cost 
(Hitt and Bryjolfsson 1996). The second is the total-
ownership-cost (TOC) of the firm’s all network 
nodes. Standardized by total assets 
0.021 
 
0.033 
 
 
CI 
Database 
Return on Asset ROA Pretax operating income divided by total asset 0.035 0.075 
Tobin’s Q TQ Tobin’s Q measure as in Bharadwaj, et al. (1999) 1.454 0.946 
Industry ROA IROA Average ROA of the 4-digit NAICS industries 0.027 0.037 
Industry Tobin’s Q IQ Average Tobin’s Q of the 4-digit NAICS industries 1.812 0.805 
Past ROA PROA Average ROA over the past 5 years 0.040 0.067 
Past Tobin’s Q PQ Average Tobin’s Q over the past 5 years 1.671 1.147 
Firm Employee  Emp  Natural logarithm of firm employee number  10.124 1.084 
Firm Sales Sales Natural logarithm of firm sales 22.560 1.164 
R&D Expenditure 
R&D 
5-year rolling-average R&D expenditure divided by 
sales 0.018 0.036 
Firm Total 
Diversification Div 
Entropy measure of total diversification as in Palepu 
(1985) 0.542 0.496 
Market Share 
MktShr 
Sales divided by industry total sales at 4-digit 
NAICS level  0.166 0.317 
Capital Structure  CapInv Total invested capital divided by total assets  0.585 0.166 
Debt-to-Equity 
Ratio  DTQ 
Total liability divided by total equity 
1.121 3.475 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compustat 
Firm 
Database 
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Table 2a. Correlation Table for IT Governance Model Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. ITDec 1.00      
2. Size 0.23*** 1.00     
3. ITKnow 0.02 -0.15*** 1.00    
4. DivBreadth 0.09*** -0.12*** 0.06*** 1.00   
5. DivMode 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.04* 0.03 1.00  
6. CorGov -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.07* -0.09*** -0.10*** 1.00 
***
 p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
Table 2b. Correlation Table for IT Investment Performance Model Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 ITGov 1.00               
2 IT 0.02 1.00              
3 ROA 0.04 0.02 1.00             
4 TQ -0.02 0.13 0.33 1.00            
5 IROA 0.05 0.04 0.32 0.18 1.00           
6 PROA 0.04 -0.02 0.30 0.18 0.11 1.00          
7 IQ 0.06 -0.02 0.18 0.49 0.19 0.08 1.00         
8 PQ -0.02 -0.11 0.26 0.56 0.13 0.13 0.34 1.00        
9 Emp -0.01 -0.13 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.21 1.00       
10 Sales 0.01 -0.27 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.27 0.83 1.00      
11 R&D 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.23 0.005 0.03 0.31 0.19 -0.05 -0.07 1.00     
12 Div -0.16 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.11 1.00    
13 MktShr -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.28 0.22 -0.09 0.14 1.00   
14 CapInv -0.02 0.08 0.12 -0.09 0.08 0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.20 0.06 0.09 0.05 1.00  
15 DTQ 0.02 0.22 -0.20 0.16 -0.10 -0.20 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 1.00 
***
 p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
Table 3. Logistic Regression on IT Governance 
Intercept  -4.111***  (0.333) 
Size 0.335***  (0.039) 
DivBreadth 0.197***  (0.061) 
DivMode 0.306***  (0.100) 
CorpGov -0.579***  (0.179) 
ITKnow 1.637***  (0.416) 
Goodness of Fit 
-2LL 2493.133*** 
Wald 325.310*** 
N                          2279 
   Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 4. IT Investment Performance Models 
 Return-on-Assets (ROA) Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Base Model IT Governance 
Model 
Base Model IT Governance 
Model 
Intercept -0.213*** 
(0.039) 
-0.214*** 
(0.038) 
-1.644*** 
(0.496) 
-1.675*** 
(0.497) 
IT Capital 0.136*** 
(0.047) 
0.166*** 
(0.052) 
2.378 *** 
(0.598) 
2.183*** 
(0.660) 
IT Governance 
Misalignment 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 
-0.026 
(0.034) 
IT Governance 
Misalignment 
     × IT Capital  
-0.478*** 
(0.102)  
-3.588*** 
(1.306) 
Sales   0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010 
(0.031) 
-0.009 
(0.031) 
Employee -0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.031) 
0.008 
(0.031) 
R&D 0.060 
(0.039) 
0.068* 
(0.039) 
0.978* 
(0.532) 
1.119** 
(0.531) 
Diversification -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.029 
(0.037) 
-0.023 
(0.037) 
Market Share 0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.430*** 
(0.059) 
0.420*** 
(0.059) 
Capital 
Investment 
0.057*** 
(0.009) 
0.059*** 
(0.009) 
1.574*** 
(0.112) 
1.587*** 
(0.112) 
Debt-to-Equity  -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Year Dummy 
2001 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.084 
(0.067) 
-0.085 
(0.067) 
Year Dummy 
2002 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.178*** 
(0.069) 
-0.174** 
(0.069) 
Year Dummy 
2003 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.070) 
0.001 
(0.070) 
Year Dummy 
2004 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.046 
(0.075) 
0.043 
(0.075) 
Industry ROA 0.359*** 
(0.041) 
0.351*** 
(0.040)   
Past ROA 0.216*** 
(0.022) 
0.200*** 
(0.022)   
Industry Q   -0.001 
(0.026) 
0.003 
(0.026) 
Past Q   0.514*** 
(0.017) 
0.506*** 
(0.017) 
R2 26.69% 28.37% 31.68% 32.41% 
N 495 495         495         495 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. All variables are centered in the regression.   Results are estimated using 
robust regression with M estimation to control for outliers. 
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Table 5. IT Investment Performance Comparison (Coefficients on IT Capital) 
 Impact on Return-on-Asset (ROA) Impact on Tobin’s Q 
Firms with average IT 
governance misalignment 
0.166*** 
(0.052) 
2.183*** 
(0.660) 
Firms with IT governance 
misalignment one standard 
deviation below the 
average 
0.420*** 
(0.090) 
4.088*** 
(1.143) 
Firms with IT governance 
misalignment one standard 
deviation above the average 
-0.088 
(0.057) 
0.278 
(0.725) 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.  Estimations are derived from the coefficients of the robust regression.  
Standard deviations are derived from the covariance matrix of the regression estimation.   
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